EXPLOIT PÚBLICO
CVE-2026-64560 Uso después de liberar por una carrera de exec() de un no líder en posix-cpu-timers del kernel de Linux
En el kernel de Linux se resolvió una vulnerabilidad de uso después de liberar (UAF) causada por una carrera entre sys_timer_delete() y exec() de un hilo no líder. Si el temporizador eliminado estaba armado y encolado en p-signal, la liberación del temporizador posix subyacente puede derivar en un UAF.
Alerta de Nureq Monitor
Detectada 15 OCT · 22:44Última novedad 24 OCT · 23:11
CVSS 3.1
7.8ALTAPROBABILIDAD DE EXPLOTACIÓN (EPSS)
0,5 % PERCENTIL 42
EXPLOTACIÓN ACTIVA
No confirmada
EXPLOIT PÚBLICO
Sí 8 REPOSITORIOS
Qué es CVE-2026-64560
En el kernel de Linux se resolvió una vulnerabilidad de uso después de liberar (UAF) causada por una carrera entre sys_timer_delete() y exec() de un hilo no líder. Si el temporizador eliminado estaba armado y encolado en p-signal, la liberación del temporizador posix subyacente puede derivar en un UAF.
Productos y versiones afectadas
Linux
Linux
Qué hacer
- Verificá si usás Linux y en qué versión: el rango afectado figura arriba.
- Actualizá a la versión corregida que indique el fabricante en su aviso (ver referencias) o aplicá la mitigación que publique.
- Priorizá la corrección: hay código de explotación público, así que el riesgo de ataque es alto.
- Revisá registros y accesos de los sistemas expuestos para descartar que se haya aprovechado antes de corregir.
Exploits y pruebas de concepto públicas
Código publicado por terceros. Puede ser malicioso: revisalo solo en un entorno aislado.
- feiguang-ai/plz110-6.12.69-cve-2026-64560-ksu ↗一加 15T(PLZ110)临时 root + KernelSU per-boot 接管:CVE-2026-64560 移植,不写分区、重启即失效。内核 6.12.69-android16-6-g242e1a07f878。PUBLICADO 15 OCT · 22:44
- maosasagawa/pmx110-cve-2026-64560 ↗PMX110 (OPPO MT6995, kernel 6.18.21) CVE-2026-64560 research: port, evidence, bounded run scriptsPUBLICADO 17 OCT · 17:00
- ChaYeWuu/prague-CVE-2026-64560-OS4.0 ↗REDMI K90 Max在OS4.0.0.14.XAACNXM利用CVE-2026-64560获取ROOT权限。PUBLICADO 17 OCT · 17:00
- totsiaw/cve-2026-64560-rmx6699 ↗CVE-2026-64560 temporary-root exploit for realme RMX6699 (Snapdragon 8 Elite, kernel 6.6.118, Android 17/COOS17)PUBLICADO 17 OCT · 17:00
- Feng1586/CVE-2026-64560-public ↗CVE-2026-64560 staged security research packagePUBLICADO 19 OCT · 10:51
- Feng1586/CVE-2026-64560-sources ↗Corresponding source for the CVE-2026-64560 public binariesPUBLICADO 19 OCT · 10:51
- Yunnijian/OnePlus16-Jailbreak ↗OnePlus 16 (PYB110) jailbreak: CVE-2026-64560 + KernelSU / KernelSU Next / BakaSU / SukiSU Ultra LKMPUBLICADO 20 OCT · 16:59
- No-World/rootkit ↗越狱助手 · RootKit for Honor Magic9 (CVE-2026-64560 → cred 写 → 自制内核模块 → KernelSU),Flutter + Shizuku 一键 rootPUBLICADO 24 OCT · 23:11
Calculadora CVSS
CVSS 3.1 · 7.8 ALTA
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- VECTOR DE ATAQUE (AV)
- Local
- COMPLEJIDAD DEL ATAQUE (AC)
- Baja
- PRIVILEGIOS REQUERIDOS (PR)
- Bajos
- INTERACCIÓN DEL USUARIO (UI)
- Ninguna
- ALCANCE (S)
- Sin cambio
- CONFIDENCIALIDAD (C)
- Alta
- INTEGRIDAD (I)
- Alta
- DISPONIBILIDAD (A)
- Alta
Abrir la calculadora completa →
Descripción original
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
posix-cpu-timers: Prevent UAF caused by non-leader exec() race
Wongi and Jungwoo decoded and reported a non-leader exec() related race
which can result in an UAF:
sys_timer_delete() exec()
posix_cpu_timer_del()
// Observes old leader
p = pid_task(pid, pid_type); de_thread()
switch_leader();
release_task(old_leader)
__exit_signal(old_leader)
sighand = lock(old_leader, sighand);
posix_cpu_timers*_exit();
sighand = lock_task_sighand(p) unhash_task(old_leader);
sh = lock(p, sighand) old_leader->sighand = NULL;
unlock(sighand);
(p->sighand == NULL)
unlock(sh)
return NULL;
// Returns without action
if(!sighand)
return 0;
free_posix_timer();
This is "harmless" unless the deleted timer was armed and enqueued in
p->signal because on exec() a TGID targeted timer is inherited.
As sys_timer_delete() freed the underlying posix timer object
run_posix_cpu_timers() or any timerqueue related add/delete operations on
other timers will access the freed object's timerqueue node, which results
in an UAF.
There is a similar problem vs. posix_cpu_timer_set(). For regular posix
timers it just transiently returns -ESRCH to user space, but for the use
case in do_cpu_nanosleep() it's the same UAF just that the k_itimer is
allocated on the stack.
Also posix_cpu_timer_rearm() fails to rearm the timer, which means it stops
to expire.
While debating solutions Frederic pointed out another problem:
posix_cpu_timer_del(tmr)
__exit_signal(p)
posix_cpu_timers*_exit(p);
unhash_task(p);
p->sighand = NULL;
sh = lock_task_sighand(p)
sighand = p->sighand;
if (!sighand)
return NULL;
lock(sighand);
if (!sh)
WARN_ON_ONCE(timer_queued(tmr));
On weakly ordered architectures it is not guaranteed that
posix_cpu_timer_del() will observe the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit()
when p->sighand is observed as NULL, which means the WARN() can be a false
positive.
Solve these issues by:
1) Changing the store in __exit_signal() to smp_store_release().
2) Adding a smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep() into the !sighand path
of lock_task_sighand().
3) Creating a helper function for looking up the task and locking sighand
which does not return when sighand == NULL. Instead it retries the
task lookup and only if that fails it gives up.
4) Using that helper in the three affected functions.
#1/#2 ensures that the reader side which observes sighand == NULL also
observes all preceeding stores, i.e. the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit()
and the ones in unhash_task().
#3 ensures that the above described non-leader exec() situation is handled
gracefully. When the task lookup returns the old leader, but sighand ==
NULL then it retries. In the non-leader exec() case the subsequent task
lookup will observe the new leader due to #1/#2. In normal exit() scenarios
the subsequent lookup fails.
When the task lookup fails, the function also checks whether the timer is
still enqueued and issues a warning if that's the case. Unfortunately there
is nothing which can be done about it, but as the task is already not
longer visible the timer should not be accessed anymore. This check also
requires memory ordering, which is not provided when the first lookup
fails. To achieve that the check is preceeded by a smp_rmb() which pairs
with the smp_wmb() in write_seqlock() in __exit_signal(). That ensures that
the stores in posix_cpu_timers*_exit() are visible.
The history of the non-leader exec() issue goes back to the early days of
posix CPU timers, which stored a pointer to the group leader task in the
timer. That obviously fails when a non-leader exec() switches the leader.
commit e0a70217107e ("posix-cpu-timers: workaround to suppress the problems
with mt exec") added a temporary workaround for that in 2010 which surv
---truncated---
Referencias
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/67aa823e3e8c229c6d374df79c804f6721cb83b6
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8bcb28abad857f1415da7656f19b2ada90af04f
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc35ddbc497311e0b6b9a6a6a4f4d1217d6ab1aa
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/12a891c773aeb5823d63dbd0cb2ab931d6c21c9b
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/e74443f5db0037c556ef436fa64b88bf4ea08f83
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a7ecc25abe6f0fecc6e62a05096987200edbd02
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad1cafa1bdaa71da85d71cac053838bbe97852b6
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/920f893f735e92ba3a1cd9256899a186b161928d
- cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html
- cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html
- cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html
Historial de la alerta
- EXPLOIT PÚBLICO Se publicó el repositorio feiguang-ai/plz110-6.12.69-cve-2026-64560-ksu.
- EXPLOIT PÚBLICO Se publicó el repositorio maosasagawa/pmx110-cve-2026-64560.
- EXPLOIT PÚBLICO Se publicó el repositorio ChaYeWuu/prague-CVE-2026-64560-OS4.0.
- EXPLOIT PÚBLICO Se publicó el repositorio totsiaw/cve-2026-64560-rmx6699.
- EXPLOIT PÚBLICO Se publicó el repositorio Feng1586/CVE-2026-64560-public.
- EXPLOIT PÚBLICO Se publicó el repositorio Feng1586/CVE-2026-64560-sources.
- EXPLOIT PÚBLICO Se publicó el repositorio Yunnijian/OnePlus16-Jailbreak.
- EXPLOIT PÚBLICO Se publicó el repositorio No-World/rootkit.
CÓMO SE HIZOResumen traducido automáticamente al español a partir de la descripción original. Ante dudas, la descripción original y las referencias del fabricante son la fuente de verdad. Cómo funciona.